







Research has suggested that firms in an emerging economy often engage in philanthropy to 
secure political legitimacy. A natural follow-up question is: will a firm remain charitable after it 
gains political legitimacy? We draw on the social exchange theory to posit that firms gaining 
greater political legitimacy, as indicated by the amount of government subsidy they received, tend 
to donate more than those who received less, to pay back the favour from the governments. In 
addition, this effect becomes stronger when the leadership in either the firms or governments 
changes, but becomes weaker when both the leadership change. Analysing a sample of venture 
firms publicly listed on China’s Growth Enterprises Market Board during the period between 2009 
and 2017, we found support for the ideas.  
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Research has shown that in emerging economies, firms tend to engage actively in politically 
motivated corporate social responsibility (CSR), such as philanthropic donation (Du, 2015; 
Sánchez, 2000). On the one hand, the governments in such contexts often demand for CSR, and 
solicit CSR donation from firms, especially those non-state firms (Ma & Parish, 2006). On the 
other hand, non-state firms are also willing to supply financial assistance in the form of CSR 
donation to seek government endorsement for political legitimacy, a status perceived as desirable 
and appropriate by governments (Sánchez, 2000; Wang & Qian, 2011). 
These studies have advanced our understandings about CSR’s instrumental role for 
gaining political legitimacy, but are quite scant on what happens afterwards if a firm gains 
political legitimacy. So the research questions we want to address in this paper are: Will a firm 
remain charitable after it becomes politically legitimate? If so, would it donate more or less than 
those who are less politically legitimate? We will examine the issues by drawing on the social 
exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). 
We first conceptualize that receiving government subsidies grants a firm with political 
legitimacy, and the more subsidy it receives, the greater the political legitimacy with which it is 
conferred (e.g., Meuleman & De Maeseneire, 2012; Söderblom, Samuelsson, Wiklund, & 
Sandberg, 2015). Gaining political legitimacy, we argue, enables a firm to create a base to engage 
in a social exchange relationship with the government (Liu, Yang, & Augustine, 2018; Su & He, 
2010; Zhang, Marquis, & Qiao, 2016).  
From the social exchange perspective, when a firm keeps receiving subsidies from 
governments, it is considered to “take” privileges from the government than other firms receiving 
less or no subsidies. To return such privileges, the firm needs to “pay back” to the government, 




Therefore, we posit that firms conferred with greater political legitimacy, as a result of 
continuously receiving a greater amount of government subsidy, tend to donate more than those 
conferred with less political legitimacy. Also, the social exchange perspective suggests that 
retaining a social exchange relationship expects continuous rewarding actions of involved parties 
and to maintain a good balance in their mutual commitments to the relationship (Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1976). However, we argue that such balance is not easy to sustain because disruptions, 
such as changes of core members in the involved parties, may occur during the process.   
We test the ideas by analysing new venture firms listed on China’s Growth Enterprises 
Market (GEM) Board during the period of 2009-2017. Chinese venture firms provide an 
appropriate context to test our hypotheses. This is because new venture firms in China are 
important contributors to philanthropy (Gao & Hafsi, 2015; Lin et al., 2015). Compared with 
those large, established state-owned firms, venture firms are small and private, and keener to give 
CSR donation to seek political legitimacy (Ma & Parish, 2006). This is because gaining political 
legitimacy provides government endorsement on the quality and growth potential of the recipient 
firms (Söderblom et al., 2015). In contrast to big, established state-owned firms, small venture 
firms have limited options to gain political legitimacy, and receiving government subsidy is an 
important one (Söderblom et al., 2015).  
Analysing an unbalanced panel dataset comprising 1,721 firm-year observations of 394 
venture firms between years 2009 and 2017, we found that after continuously receiving greater 
government subsidies, venture firms that tend to make more CSR donations. This relationship 
becomes stronger when either the firm or the local government in a social exchange pair replaced 
their leaders; yet the relationship becomes weaker when the leaders in both parties changed.  




perspective (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) to understand why venture firms conferred with greater 
political legitimacy as a result of receiving more government subsidies are still keen to increase 
their CSR donations. Prior research on political CSR has suggested that gaining legitimacy is an 
important outcome sought by firms via their CSR donation (Lin et al., 2015; Ma & Parish, 2006; 
Sánchez, 2000; Wang & Qian, 2011; Zhang et al., 2016). Our paper goes beyond this literature by 
illuminating that gaining political legitimacy is not the end of a firm’s CSR donation, but can be a 
start of new cycle of engagement in CSR donation, with the aim to retain an ongoing social 
exchange relationship with the governments. In addition, our findings highlight the importance of 
changes of the agents (leaders) in affecting the social exchange relationship. As such, this paper 
identifies important boundary conditions that affect a firm’s effort in retaining the social exchange 
relationship with governments, illuminating a complex dynamic process of business-government 
social exchange relationship. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Politically Motivated CSR in an Emerging Economy 
Prior research identifies firms’ strategic purposes of doing philanthropy, and suggests that 
firms often donate to achieve a synergistic outcome through investing their resources at societal 
issues that at the same time resonate with their business interests (Saiia, Carroll, & Buchholtz, 
2003). Venture firms tend to be strategic in their CSR activities, especially in emerging economies 
(Sánchez, 2000). This is because CSR donation helps venture firms to gain legitimacy that is critical 
for them to obtain necessary resources needed for their survival and growth (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Suchman, 1995). Recent studies have referred to such philanthropic donation as a form of 




in politically motivated CSR is to achieve political legitimacy, which as a consequence, can further 
bring accreditation, status, and resources to the ventures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Sánchez, 2000; 
Suchman, 1995).  
In an emerging economy, governments not only make rules and policies to regulate the 
allocation and transactions of critical resources (Gao & Hafsi, 2015; Marquis & Qian, 2013), but 
also are often the controllers of critical resources such as land, bank credit, and permit (Dickson, 
2003; Gao & Hafsi, 2015; Marquis & Qian, 2013). More importantly, governments often serve as 
a critical stakeholder and legitimacy provider that is very influential on other stakeholders and 
resource providers (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Peng & Luo, 2000). Therefore firms, especially venture 
firms, often feel compelled to engage in philanthropic donation, with an aim to obtain government 
endorsement and seek political legitimacy (Hillman, 2005; Wang & Qian, 2011; Zhang et al., 2016). 
For example, Gao and Hafsi (2015) showed that government intervention increases firms’ 
donations. In another study, Gao and Hafsi (2017) found that firms depending more on the 
government for support or receiving more scrutiny from the government donate more. Su and He 
(2010) found that philanthropy activities offer an important way for private firm owners to protect 
their property rights informally and nurture political connections that may lead to more profitability.  
Government Subsidies Confer Political Legitimacy to Venture Firms  
Venture firms are for-profit organisations that generally have lasted for a short period of 
time since their incorporation (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Governments across countries often 
subsidise venture firms to promote and support their growth (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016; Lerner, 
2010). The primary goal of subsidizing is to identify the venture firms that meet national priorities, 
such as technology advanced ones and those in strategical sectors, and then provide financial 




Government subsidy could be in the form of tax rebates or other non-tax forms, such as direct cash 
and debt forgiveness (Lee et al., 2014). According to the China Government Guidance Fund 
Development Research Report 2016 (Zero2IPO Research, 2016), the Chinese government at all 
levels had set up a total amount of $320 billion funding to support venture firms by the end of 2015.  
In the literature, government subsidy has been mostly considered as financial resources 
granted to a venture firm (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016; Lerner, 2010). What has not been emphasized 
adequately enough, we believe, is that receiving government subsidy also signals that a venture 
firm and its businesses are desirable and meet the expectation of governments. Compared to those 
large and established firms, venture firms are subject to liability of newness and smallness (Singh, 
Tucker, & House, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965). Hence without political legitimacy, venture firms 
will face severe challenges to access resources from various stakeholders and resource providers, 
including financial institutions, employees, suppliers, customers, and many others (Stinchcombe, 
1965). 
Government Subsidy and CSR Donation: A Social Exchange Perspective  
Among all the subsidised venture firms that are listed on China’s GEM board in year 2017, 
nearly 70% continued their philanthropic donations, and surprisingly, many of them increased their 
donation in subsequent years after they received government subsidies. These observations are 
interesting and important, yet cannot be fully explained by the existing view that firms’ engagement 
in philanthropic donations is primarily to seek political legitimacy (e.g., Li et al., 2015; Wang & 
Qian, 2011)). It is necessary to employ a more dynamic view to understand why a (venture) firm 
continues to donate (even more) after it gains (more) political legitimacy. Su and Tsang (2015) has 
noted, ‘a donation is not the end of give but a start of take’, which implies that giving CSR 




logic (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976).  
The social exchange theory was originally proposed and developed to understand the 
dynamics in interpersonal relationships (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). 
Developing interpersonal relationship is a continuous and dynamic process in which the involved 
individuals often need to conduct social exchanges (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976), where once a 
party ‘takes’ an offer from the other, it often needs to reciprocate by returning some favour back to 
that party in the future. Such relationship then evolves into a trusting, loyal, and mutually 
committed relationship over time (Emerson, 1976; Gergen, 1969).   
Although social exchange theory originates from the individual level, it has been extended 
to organizational and interorganizational level, such as joint ventures and alliances (Aiken & Hage, 
1968; Das & Teng, 2002; Levine & White, 1961). For instance, Steensma and Lyles (2000) applied 
the theory to explain how the ownership structure of international joint ventures (IJV) affects the 
potential social exchange relations (conflicts) between the parents and their IJVs. Also the social 
exchange theory has been applied to understand the business-government interactions and 
relationship (e.g., Liu et al., 2018; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). Building on this line of thinking, 
our paper conceptualizes that a venture firm engages in a social exchange relationship with its 
administrative government so that the government grants the legitimacy (subsidy) to the firm, while 
the firm pays back by making more CSR donations.  
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Government Subsidy, Political Legitimacy, and Philanthropic Donations 
Subsidy is a common approach used by governments across countries to foster the 




economies with weak institutions, receiving continuous government subsidies provides a certifying 
effect on selected venture firms, and enhances their political legitimacy. Compared with large and 
established firms, absence of track records make venture firms appear legitimacy deficient to 
various stakeholders and potential resource providers (Aldrich, 1999; Stinchcombe, 1965). If a 
venture firm continuously receives subsidies from government, this signals that the venture firm 
has a promising growth potential according to the governments, and obtains political legitimacy as 
a result (Meuleman & De Maeseneire, 2012). Such conferred political legitimacy via government 
subsidy may further enable the venture firms to obtain resources from other resource providers in 
an emerging economy (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). This is evident in Söderblom 
et al. (2015) which found that subsidised new ventures attract more human and financial capital 
than their non-subsidised peers. 
Prior research has mainly focused on the effect of government subsidies on alleviating the 
legitimacy concerns over venture firms, and as a result, benefiting the venture firms in terms of 
their growth, innovation and survival rates (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016; Meuleman & De Maeseneire, 
2012; Söderblom et al., 2015). Yet as mentioned, it is largely unknown why and to what extent 
continuously receiving government subsidies, and achieving great political legitimacy as a result, 
will drive a venture firm to further engage in CSR donations. We posit that a continuous receipt of 
government subsidies enables venture firms becomes more tied with governments, and motivate 
the firms to retain and build up such business-government ties. Yet in maintaining such social 
exchange relationship with governments, a venture firm cannot just be a ‘taker’ all the time, but 
also need to be a ‘giver’ (such as making philanthropic donations) at some time to reciprocate the 
“favour” taken from the governments (Li et al., 2015; Wang & Luo, 2018; Zhang et al., 2016).  




improve the social welfare and meet governments’ non-financial targets (Liu et al., 2018; Wang & 
Qian, 2011). Therefore from the social exchange perspective, continuously receiving government 
subsidies would compel venture firms to increase their CSR donations to reciprocate the helping 
hand of governments, and sustain a virtuous cycle of social exchange with the governments. We 
hence propose, 
Hypothesis 1: A continuous receipt of government subsidy drives a venture firm to make 
more CSR donations in return.  
Continuing social exchange relationship needs commitment and efforts from both involved 
parties (Emerson, 1976). Exchange ratio is an important indicator to delineate the relative 
commitments between the two involved parties (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1976). More 
specifically, Cook and Emerson (1978) used Axi:Byj as the notation of exchange ratio, where A and 
B are actors, and x and y denote the different “resources” exchanged between A and B. In their 
relationship, A and B explore a balance in their offers and counter offers of different amounts of x 
and y. For example, if A initiates an exchange by offering x1 and then B is expected to reward y1. 
In a series of transactions between A and B, A can decide xi based on yj offered in the prior round 
of exchange, and so as to B for yj.  
Presumably there is a balance point where each party in the relationship can agree on an 
exchange ratio (Emerson, 1976). Yet it doesn’t mean the balance point can be always achieved, nor 
that each involved party can always realize the optimal exchange ratio (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). 
For instance, Blau (1964: 94) noted, “Since there is no way to assure an appropriate return for a 
favour, social exchange requires trusting others to discharge their obligations”. Therefore, the 
exchange ratio of x/y is subject to the trust between the two parties. As such, any factors affecting 




relationship, fostering the shift of the exchange ratio (x/y) (Blau, 1964). In light of the logic, we 
submit that changes of agents in either of the involved parties impair the trust between the parties.  
In the context of China, ‘local governors’, as the leader agents for the prefecture-city 
governments, have substantial power and discretionary control over local resources (Li, Xia, & 
Zajac, 2018). They make rules and policies that affect the venture firms operating within their 
region (Zhong, Lin, Gao, & Yang, 2019). Venture leaders are the key decision makers and need to 
make various strategic decisions regarding the venture growth, including the decisions on CSR 
donations (Zhang et al., 2016). The social exchange relationships between venture firms and local 
governments are largely maintained when venture leaders and local governors trust the other party 
is willing to continue the current relationship. As a result, changes of local governors and/or venture 
leaders will disrupt the trust, hurting the existing firm-government social exchange relationship 
(i.e., CSR donations). Specifically, we posit that the change of leaders in either party is likely to 
embark firms to repair the loss of trust by investing more efforts in the exchange relationship. 
However, when the leaders of governments and venture firms both change, the loss of trust between 
the two parties is significant and deem to be unrepairable.  
The Moderating Effect of Local Governor Change 
Local governors make decisions to influence local institutions, hence their turnovers and 
replacements are likely to generate uncertainties to the firm-government social relationship, and 
impair the trust between the two parties (Zhong et al., 2019). Under such circumstance, if a venture 
firm wants to continue the relationship and retain the trust with the government, it needs to do more 
to show their sincerity in committing to the relationship (Julio & Yook, 2016; Lin et al., 2015; 
Zhong et al., 2019). As such, we argue, by increasing its exchange ratio in the social exchange with 




governments with the new governors (Emerson, 1976).  
In China, the central government sets national economic policies and appoints the leaders 
of local governments (i.e., governors), whereas local governments set their own goals, develop 
strategies for the prefecture cities within their administration, and appoint leadership teams in each 
city (Li & Zhou, 2005; Nee, 1992; Wang & Luo, 2018). As a result of fiscal decentralisation in 
China, prefecture-city governments have obtained greater authority and flexibility in their districts 
(Li & Zhou, 2005; Nee, 1992). City governors have seized major resources and power to develop 
local economy and improve social welfare in their jurisdictions (Chen, Li, & Zhou, 2005; Marquis 
& Qian, 2013). It should be noted that although city governors may not directly allocate subsidy to 
venture firms, they often play a crucial role in determining the actual operation of subsidy policy, 
and approving the subsidy allocation to venture firms (Lin et al., 2015). 
When local governors are replaced, the regimes regulating subsidy allocation and its 
implementation may not necessarily be endorsed by new governors (Zhong et al., 2019). After new 
governors assume their leadership, they often make new initiatives and policy changes, which 
signal the new governors’ willingness and determination to reform the existing policy schemes and 
execution to improve the local economy (Li & Zhou, 2005). The Chinese saying, ‘A new broom 
sweeps clean’ (Xin guan shang ren san ba huo) is a good reflection of this situation (Zhong et al., 
2019).  
To summarize, changes in local governors will impair the trust between the two parties, and 
disrupt the existing social exchange relationship between venture firms and local governments. To 
overcome such problems, venture firms are likely to increase their exchange ratio by making more 
philanthropic donations, to show their enhanced commitment to the social relationship with the 




can foresee the stability in the current subsidy policies and are likely to maintain a same level of 
donation commitment for retaining the exchange relation with local governments. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between the government subsidy that a venture firm 
receives and the philanthropic donation made by the venture becomes stronger when the 
local governors change.   
The Moderating Effect of Venture Leadership Change  
In light of a similar logic, the leadership change in a venture firm will also impair the trust 
between the venture firm and the local governments, and disrupt the existing firm-government 
relationship. To repair the reduced trust, arguably the new venture leadership tends to increase its 
exchange ratio with the governments by investing more to the relationship, such as making more 
CSR donations.  
Evidence has shown that new firm leadership is often followed with reforms in the firm 
structure and strategy (Daily & Dalton, 1995; Sliwka, 2007). Local government would not have a 
same level of trust on the new firm leadership (Das & Teng, 2002), causing uncertainty about the 
eligibility of a venture firm in receiving the government subsidy. To repair such lack of trust from 
the local government and governors, venture firms led by new leaders are keen to invest more 
efforts in their exchange relationship with the governments. To seek a new balance in the firm-
government relationship, ventures with new leadership tend to increase their exchange ratio by 
making more philanthropic donation in response to the same amount of subsidy that they received 
from the governments. Therefore, we propose:   
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the government subsidy that a venture firm 




when the venture leader changes.   
The Three-Way Interaction among Government Subsidy, Venture Leadership Change and 
Change of Local Governors 
We argued that venture firms tend to increase their exchange ratio in the social exchange 
relationship with the governments in response to the change of leaders in either of the two parties. 
It is possible that changes of venture leadership and local governors may occur around a same time 
period. If this happens, how would venture firms adjust their commitment to the social exchange 
relationships with governments?  
To address this puzzle, we propose a three-way interaction and argue that firms are less 
likely to increase their commitment (or exchange ratio) to the exchange relationship with the 
governments when both the governors and venture leaders change, than they are when leaders only 
change in one party. This is because the leadership changes in both parties damage the mutual trust 
to the extent that is perceived as unrepairable (Chan & Feng, 2018). When the trust between venture 
firms with new leaders and governments with new governors reduced to the minimum or even 
disappears, firms are unlikely to maintain the exchange ratio as they did before. Differently, when 
only one party replaces the leaders while the other party remains unchanged, the disruption on the 
trust between the two parties is still considered repairable, and urges venture firms to increase their 
exchange ratio, such as donating more, to repair the existing social exchange relationship with 
governments.  
To summarize, we propose that the disruption caused by the leadership changes in both 
involved parties is destructive, and weakens venture firms’ tendency to increase their exchange 
ratio in relationship with the governments.  




leadership change and replacement of local governors in predicting the amount of 
philanthropic donation made by a venture firm, such that the positive relationship between 
the government subsidy that a venture firm receives and the amount of philanthropic 
donation it made becomes the weakest when the venture leaders and local governors both 
change, than when only venture leaders or when only local governors change.  
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample Selection 
We used a sample of firms listed on China’s growth enterprises market (GEM) board to test 
our hypotheses. The GEM board is a tailor-made securities market that offers external financing 
channels and a low entry threshold for entrepreneurial firms (Qian, Wang, Geng, & Yu, 2017). 
GEM-listed firms are mostly high-tech firms. In this study, our sample only focuses on firms in the 
manufacturing and information technology sectors, which not only account for more than 90% of 
total GEM-listed firms, but also the types of firms favoured by government subsidy.  
We collected firm-level data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database which provides important information on the finance and leaders of a firm (Li 
et al., 2015; Marquis & Qian, 2013; Wang & Qian, 2011). Our data starts from 2009 because the 
GEM board was officially launched in 2009. In addition, we sourced city-level data from various 
years of the China City Statistical Yearbook, published by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (Stallkamp, Pinkham, Schotter, & Buchel, 2017). Furthermore, we reviewed firms’ annual 
reports to manually collect data on each venture firm’s donation and government subsidy. We 
identified and reviewed the official websites of prefecture-city governments and manually coded 




governors change by searching the related information on Baidu.com, the most commonly used 
search engine in China (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). In the end by consolidating 
the different sources of information, we assembled an unbalanced panel dataset comprising 1,721 
firm-year observations of 394 venture firms between years 2009 and 2017. 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable, amount of philanthropic donation, was measured as the amount of 
a venture firm’s charitable contribution in a given year. Because this variable is highly skewed, we 
took a natural logarithm transformation of it (Wang & Qian, 2011; Zhang, Rezaee, & Zhu, 2010).  
Independent Variables  
Government subsidy. Following the prior studies (Lee et al., 2014), we measured this 
variable using the amount of subsidy obtained from the local governments. In order to indicate the 
continuity of receiving government subsidy, we measured this variable using the average amount 
of subsidy received from the local governments in the prior three years. We also took a natural 
logarithm of this variable. For robust checks, we also computed the average amount of government 
subsidy using one-year, two-year, four-year and five-year windows (Miller, Xu, & Mehrotra, 2015). 
The results remain largely consistent.  
Local governors change. Following the previous studies (An, Chen, Luo, & Zhang, 2016), 
we measured local governors change at the level of prefecture-city. In China’s bureaucratic system, 
mayor is a top leader in a city, who is mainly responsible for the local economic development 
(Wang & Luo, 2018). We measured local governors change using a dummy indicator, equal to 1 if 
the mayor of the city was replaced in the last year and 0 otherwise.  
Firm leadership change. Previous studies (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; 




replacement may significantly influence corporate performance (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006), and 
strategic CSR engagement (Harjoto & Jo, 2011). In this study, we measured firm leadership change 
as a dummy variable, with 1 indicating that the chairman of a firm was replaced in the last year and 
0 otherwise (Kuzman, Talavera, & Bellos, 2018).  
Control Variables 
We carefully selected a set of control variables to account for firm-, regional, and industrial, 
characteristics. Firstly, we controlled the prior experience and involvement with governments by 
the chairman of a firm, which, we believe, may influence the firm’s orientation toward 
philanthropic behaviour (Zhang et al., 2016). Government experience, a dummy variable, equals 
to 1 if a chairman served as a government official before, or 0 otherwise (Du, 2017; Fan, Wong, & 
Zhang, 2007). Political involvement was also a dummy indicator, with 1 indicating that a chairman 
previously served or is currently serving as a delegate for two major political bodies in China, 
including the People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference either 
at the national level or regional level (Li et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2016).  
We also controlled for a number of firm characteristics. Firm size was measured as the 
natural logarithm of total sales. Large firms tend to be relatively more resourceful and thus more 
likely to donate (Brammer & Millington, 2006; Buchholtz, Amason, & Rutherford, 1999; Wang & 
Qian, 2011). Firm age was computed as the number of years since the firm was established. 
Although all of the GEM firms are relatively young, those with a longer history are more likely to 
accumulate resources, and then donate more (Gao & Hafsi, 2015). Slack resource was measured as 
the long-term debt divided by total assets. Surely, a firm’s easy access to resources would affect its 
philanthropic strategy (Seifert, Morris, & Bartkus, 2004). Financial performance was measured as 




have more resources to donate (Gao & Hafsi, 2015; McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988). 
State ownership was measured as the percentage of the state share to a firm’s total share. Firms 
with state ownership have a formalized ties with the governments, and thus are less likely to rely 
on donations to reciprocate the helping hand of local governments (Li et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, we controlled the city level characteristics. GDP per city was measured as the 
natural logarithm of a city’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This reflects a city’s economic 
development, which may also have a positive effect on driving local firms’ philanthropic donations 
(Marquis & Qian, 2013). Finally, considering that government subsidy policies differ across 
industries, regions and years, we also included industry dummies, city dummies and year dummies 
to capture these variances.  
Model Specification 
Since the amount of a firm’s philanthropic donation was conditioned on whether the firm 
donates or not in the first place (Wang & Qian, 2011). Therefore, if only using the subsample of 
firms that donated, our analysis results may be subject to the sample selection bias. We then 
estimated a two-stage Heckman selection model to correct such potential sample selection bias 
(Heckman, 1979). In the first stage, the likelihood of a firm making philanthropic donation was 
estimated by applying the probit model to the full sample of firms listed at GEM. As the first-stage 
model must include one more variable that is not utilized in the second-stage regression, we 
followed previous studies (Wang & Qian, 2011), and included industry-level philanthropy, 
measured as the logarithm of the average philanthropic amount within each industry. The “inverse 
Mills ratio” (IMR), which reflects an adjustment term, was calculated and included as a control 
variable in the second-stage regression analyses.  




of firm philanthropy using the subsample of firms that actually donate. The subsample has a panel 
data structure. We then conducted the Breusch-Pegan test and White test for the second-stage 
estimation, and the significance results (𝑝𝑝 = 0.000), suggested there is a homoskedasticity bias in 
the sample (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; White, 1980). To minimize the heteroskedasticity problem, 
we adopted a generalized least squares (GLS) model to test the hypotheses. The model specification 
was estimated as the following Eq. (1). 
Firm philanthropy𝑡𝑡+1
= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
× 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
× 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 × 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
(1) 
where 𝛽𝛽1, the coefficient of government subsidy, is the main focus of interest in Hypothesis 1; 𝛽𝛽4 
and 𝛽𝛽5  are the coefficients of the interactions between government subsidy and leadership 
changes in either local governors or venture firms; 𝛽𝛽7  is the coefficient of the three-way 
interactions among government subsidy, firm leadership change and change of local governors; 








Table 1 reports the characteristics of the final sample for analysis, including maximum 
value, minimum value, mean, number of observations and percentage of observations for each 
variable included in the model analyses. The greater amount of firm philanthropy was 30 million 
RMB with a mean of 376 thousand RMB. In terms of government subsidy, in our sample, venture 
firms received an average of 12.9 million RMB in government subsidy, while the maximum value 
was 445.2 million RMB. Regarding firm leadership change, about 12.18% of firms in our sample 
revealed the change of chairmen in boards, and 60.8% of the observations (1,046) witnessed a 
replacement of local governors.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all of the explanatory 
and control variables. As expected, government subsidy received by a venture firm is positively 
correlated with the amount of philanthropy it donates (𝑝𝑝 = 0.000). The correlations among all of 
the other explanatory variables are less than 0.5, reflecting a low level of multicollinearity (Lind, 
Marchal, & Wathen, 2012). The maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.20 with a mean of 
1.39. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a serious concern in this study. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Hypotheses Testing 
Table 3 presents the results of the first-stage probit model, estimated by the likelihood of 
firm’s philanthropy. All control variables and a constant were included in Model 1. Model 2 added 




IMR based on Model 3 to correct for the potential sample selection bias.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4 presents the result of the second-stage GLS regression analysis. Model 4 only 
included the control variables. Model 5 added government subsidy to test our Hypothesis 1. Model 
6 and Model 7 included the two-way interaction terms to test the moderating effects of firm 
leadership change and local governors change, respectively. Finally in Model 9, we tested the three-
way interaction effect as proposed in H4. 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that government subsidy received by a venture firm is positively 
associated with the philanthropic donation of the firm. In Model 5, government subsidy has a 
positive coefficient with the 0.1% level of significance (𝛽𝛽 = 0.28;  𝑝𝑝 = 0.000). In terms of the 
substantive effect of government subsidy (Kingsley & Graham, 2017), we found that in our sample, 
one standard deviation (SD) increase in government subsidy received by a venture firm leads to a 
0.16 SD increase in the amount of donation by the firm. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 predict that the change in either local governors or firm 
leadership strengthens the positive relationship between government subsidy and the amount of 
philanthropic donation. As shown in Model 6, the interaction term, Government subsidy × Local 
governors change, yields a positive and significant coefficient (𝛽𝛽 = 0.09;  𝑝𝑝 = 0.002). This result 
supports Hypothesis 2. Similarly, the interaction term of Government subsidy × Firm leadership 
change in Model 7 is also positive and significant (𝛽𝛽 = 0.33;  𝑝𝑝 = 0.03 ), thus supporting 
Hypothesis 3. 
To better interpret these two moderating effects, we followed the previous studies (Burgers 




command in STATA and plotted the moderating effects as proposed in Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 
3. As shown in Figure 1(a), when the local governor is replaced, the positive relationship between 
government subsidy and firm philanthropy becomes stronger. Then holding other variables 
constant, we also calculated the Average marginal effects (AME) of government subsidy on 
donations at representative values of firm leadership change (0 and 1 as representative values). The 
result shows that, when local governors are replaced, the marginal effect of government subsidy on 
the amount of philanthropic donations increases 11.8% from 21.7% to 33.5%. Similarly, Figure 
1(b) reveals that with firm leadership change, the positive relationship between government 
subsidy and philanthropic donation becomes stronger. Regarding the effect size, the AME results 
show that, when the firm leadership is changed, the marginal effect of government subsidy on the 
amount of philanthropic donations increases 27.8% from 27.3% to 55.1%, holding other variables 
constant. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
We also hypothesized that there is a three-way interaction among government subsidy, firm 
leadership change and change of local governors. Combining the above results, the coefficient for 
the three-way interaction term as shown in Model 9, Government subsidy × Firm leadership 
change × Local governor, was negative and significant (𝛽𝛽 = −1.08;  𝑝𝑝 = 0.04), providing the 
evidence that the relationship between government subsidy and philanthropic donation becomes 
the least positive when leaders are replaced in both the parties. Thus, the Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 




confirms Hypothesis 4 by showing that the positive relationship between government subsidy and 
philanthropic donation when governors and firm leaders are both replaced, as indicated by Line 
(4), is significantly smaller than the positive relationships as indicated in both Line (2) and Line 
(3). Line (2) and Line (3) respectively depict the positive relationship between government subsidy 
and firm philanthropy when either the firm leaders or the local governors are replaced. In terms of 
the effect magnitude, we found by holding other variables constant, 1% increase of government 
subsidy leads to 8.8% increase in philanthropic donation when both firm leaders and local 
governors are changed. However, 1% increase of government subsidy results in 31.5% increase in 
philanthropic donation when only local governors are changed, or 126% increase in donation when 
only firm leaders are replaced.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Robustness Analysis 
We conducted additional analyses to test whether our regression results are robust. First, 
we adopted several alternative measures of the independent variable to check whether our findings 
are robust. In doing so, we re-calculated government subsidy using one-year, two-year, four-year 
and five-year time windows. As shown in the Table 5, the coefficients of our main variables and 
interaction terms are largely consistent to the main results as reported in Table 4. This further lends 
support to our hypotheses.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Second, previous studies suggested that engaging in philanthropic activities can help firms 




To test whether this is the case in our context, we conducted the panel Granger causality tests to 
examine the dual-directional causality between government subsidy and firm philanthropy (Abrigo 
& Love, 2016; Granger, 1969). As shown in Panel A of Table 6, all 𝐹𝐹 statistics of Granger 
causality from government subsidy to firm philanthropy are significant in each lag lengths but 
insignificant from firm philanthropy to government subsidy. The results confirm that the risk of 
reverse causality is low in our analyses and indeed, it is government subsidies that cause firm 
philanthropy.   
Furthermore, we adopted the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions to mitigate the 
other potential endogeneity. For example, firm receiving greater government subsidy can be more 
innovative and capable, so that they are more likely to be profitable, allowing them to donate more. 
To test this potential endogeneity, we identified research and development (R&D) investment as 
the instrumental variable in our 2SLS regressions. R&D investment is an appropriate instrument 
variable, because numerous prior studies have documented the positive relationship between a 
firm’s R&D investment and the government subsidy it receives (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, & 
Semadeni, 2016; Dai & Cheng, 2015). Yet there is no clear evidence that a firm’s R&D investment 
has any significant relationship with its philanthropy. Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of 
2SLS regressions at both stages. As shown in the first stage analysis (Model 14), the R&D 
investment, our instrumental variable, has a positive and significant effect (𝛽𝛽 = 0.49;  𝑝𝑝 = 0.000) 
on government subsidy. In the second stage (Model 15), our independent variable, government 
subsidy, has a positive and significant coefficient ( 𝛽𝛽 = 0.70;  𝑝𝑝 = 0.009 ), showing that 
government subsidy still has a positive relationship with firm philanthropy even after correcting 
for the endogeneity.  




instrumental variable (Bascle, 2008). The results in Table 6 show that the 𝐹𝐹-statistics value (𝛽𝛽 =
159.55) is larger than the threshold value 10 as suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005), meaning 
that our instrumental variable is strong enough to satisfy the exogeneity and strength requirements 
for an instrumental variable. In addition, the significant result of under-identification test (𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼-
statistics) (p<0.001) reported in Table 6 also shows that the instrumental variable we identified is 
appropriate.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We draw on the social exchange theory to posit that firms gaining greater political 
legitimacy, as indicated by the amount of government subsidy they received, tend to donate more 
than those who received less, to pay back the favour from the governments. Analysing a sample of 
venture firms listed in China’s GEM Board during the period of 2009-2017, we found that venture 
firms continuously receiving greater government subsidy tend to donate more than those firms 
receiving less government subsidies. In addition, this positive effect of government subsidy on firm 
philanthropy becomes stronger when the leaders of one party, either the local governments or the 
firms, are replaced. Yet when the leaders of the two parties are both changed, the positive effect of 
government subsidy on firm philanthropy becomes reduced, indicating a significant three way 
interaction between government subsidy, firm leadership change and change in local governors on 
firm philanthropic donation. The present study departs the literature on politically motivated CSR 
in three significant ways.  




motivated CSR. The political CSR literature largely assumes that CSR is an effective approach by 
firms to seek political legitimacy (Lin et al., 2015; Ma & Parish, 2006; Sánchez, 2000; Wang & 
Qian, 2011; Zhang et al., 2016). Our findings corroborate the previous literature regarding firms’ 
motivation to conduct political CSR. Yet applying the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 
1976), we go beyond the prior literature to show that firms granted with political legitimacy, as a 
result of receiving government subsidy, tend to perceive this as a favour from the government. 
Hence to reciprocate the favour, these firms would want to make more philanthropic donations. In 
this way, our paper sheds lights to the literature on politically motivated CSR and demonstrate that 
gaining political legitimacy is not the end of CSR donation for venture firms, but a start of 
developing a new social reciprocal relationship with the governments.  
In addition, this study extends the social exchange theory to a new context, business-
government interaction. On the one hand, our framing of receiving government subsidy as an 
important form of granted political legitimacy and donation as a “pay back” to government, spells 
out an implicit social exchange relationship between businesses and governments. As such, our 
study extends the social exchange theory from the interpersonal, inter-firm interactions to the 
business-government interactions.  
On the other hand, this study also advances the social exchange theory by identifying 
important boundary conditions in affecting the dynamics of the social exchange relationship 
between firms and the governments. As noted, the relative commitments invested by firms and 
governments (i.e., the exchange ratio) into the exchange relationship are grounded in the social 
exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). Yet few studies explicitly investigate the process of 
social exchange (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), and what factors drive the respective investments 




this study, we confirm that leadership changes in either governments or firms foster the firms to 
increase their input into the exchange relationship; yet interestingly, leadership changes in both 
firms and governments at the same time curb the firms from increasing their exchange ratio in their 
social exchange relationship with the governments.   
Practical Implications 
Our findings inform valuable implications to mangers and policy makers. Prior studies on 
philanthropy behaviours of large national or multinational companies often assume that corporate 
donations will rise and fall with the availability of resources (Buchholtz et al., 1999; McGuire et 
al., 1988; Seifert, Morris, & Bartkus, 2003). Yet our study suggests that that despite facing the 
resource constraints, venture firms are also keen to make donations, especially those receiving 
greater government subsidy tend to make more philanthropic donation to reciprocate the favour 
from the government. 
Our findings suggest that venture firms with greater political legitimacy tend to regard 
donations as a way to pay back the governments and sustain an ongoing social exchange 
relationship with the local governments. When interacting with local governments, venture firms 
would like to show their appreciation for the local governments’ helping hand and their willingness 
to maintain a long-term and reciprocal relationship with local governments. As such, donation 
actually is not an “one-shot” strategy to obtain political legitimacy as discussed in prior studies, 
but also an effective tool to develop and sustain a virtuous cycle of social exchange relationship 
with the governments (Su & Tsang, 2015). 
Limitation and Future Research 
The paper has several limitations that inform new directions for future research. Firstly, our 




contexts where governments seldom or do not subsidize. The relationships established in this study 
is more applicable to other emerging economies where business-government interactions are 
important for firm growth and development. Hence it is interesting for future research to test our 
findings in other emerging economies.  
In addition, corporate donations can be in various forms. In this study, we only focused on 
cash-based donations. Future research can extend to other forms of corporate philanthropy or other 
forms of CSR engagement. Our use of dummy indicators to reflect the leadership changes in firms 
and governments is unable to fully capture the importance of leadership changes in shaping the 
social exchange relationships between the two involved parties. For instance, a new firm leader 
can be promoted either internally or from outside. A replaced governor may be promoted or 
demoted. Such subtle differences in leadership changes are not captured in the current study. 
Therefore future research is warranted to examine these subtle differences between the new and 
old firm leaders and their implications on how the firm-government social exchange relationship 
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Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Max Min Mean No. of obs. % of obs. 
Firm philanthropy      
  Have 1 1 1 1,057 61.42 
  Not have 0 0 0 664 38.58 
Philanthropy amount (10,000 RMB) 3,000.00 0 37.60 1,721 100 
Government subsidy (10,000 RMB) 44,521.10 0 1,286.68 1,721 100 
Local governors change      
  Have 1 1 1 1,046 60.78 
  Not have 0 0 0 675 39.22 
Firm leaders change      
  Change 1 1 1 59 3.43 
  No change 0 0 0 1,662 96.57 
Government experience      
  Have 1 1 1 119 6.91 
  Not have 0 0 0 1,602 93.09 
Political involvement      
  Have 1 1 1 379 22.02 
  Not have 0 0 0 1,342 77.98 
Firm size (10,000 RMB) 4,100,000.00 690.00 86,356.47 1,721 100 
Firm age 29 2 12.48 1,721 100 
Slack resource 0.79 0.01 0.22 1,721 100 
Financial performance 0.37 -0.46 0.06 1,721 100 
State ownership 0.72 0 0.01 1,721 100 
City GDP (100,000,000 RMB) 25,123.45 374.54 10,627.54 1,721 100 
Industry      
  Manufacturing - - - 1,340 77.86 





Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
No. Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Philanthropy amount (𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺) 11.97 1.66 1            
2 Government subsidy (𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺) 15.43 0.92 0.19 1           
3 Local governors change 0.64 0.48 0.04 0.26 1          
4 Firm leadership change 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.06 1         
5 Government experience  0.09 0.28 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.05 1        
6 Political involvement 0.31 0.46 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.08 1       
7 Firm size (𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺) 20.25 0.73 0.22 0.48 0.20 0.03 0.03 -0.06 1      
8 Firm age 12.75 4.69 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.10 1     
9 Slack resource 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.49 0.05 1    
10 Financial performance 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.16 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.29 1   
11 State ownership 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 1  
12 City GDP (𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺) 17.93 0.97 0.01 0.07 -0.15 -0.03 -0.08 -0.18 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.17 -0.06 1 
13 Inverse Mills ratio 0.43 0.35 -0.24 -0.26 -0.23 0.04 -0.10 -0.31 -0.43 -0.16 -0.17 -0.13 0.03 0.35 






Estimates for Heckman First-Stage Models 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 








































































Industry dummies Included Included Included 
City dummies Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Log-likelihood -902.79 -901.67 -838.36 
Wald 𝜒𝜒2 141.52*** 142.75*** 194.38*** 
Number of observations 1,721 1,721 1,721 





Estimates for Heckman Second-Stage Models 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Independent variable:        










Two-way interactions:       
Government subsidy × Local 
governors change (H2) 






Government subsidy × Firm 
leadership change (H3) 






Local governors change × 
Firm leadership change 
     -0.58 
(0.49) 
Three-way interaction:       
Government subsidy × Firm 
leadership change × Local 
governors change (H4) 
     -1.08* 
(0.53) 
Control variables:       
















































































































































Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
City dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 













Number of observations 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 
















 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Independent variable:      








Two-way interactions:     
Government subsidy × Local 









Government subsidy × Firm 









Local governors change Firm 









Three-way interaction:     
Government subsidy × Firm 
leadership change × Local 









Control variables:     
































































































Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
City dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Wald 𝜒𝜒2 10575.71*** 6685.10*** 3407.25*** 2901.06*** 
Number of observations 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 





Robustness Check: Granger Causality Test and 2SLS Regression Results 
Panel A: Panel Granger causality test 
Lag lengths Causality from government 
subsidy to firm philanthropy 
 Causality from firm philanthropy to 
government subsidy 
 𝐹𝐹 statistics 𝑃𝑃- value  𝐹𝐹 statistics 𝑃𝑃- value 
1 11.12*** 0.001  0.97 0.326 
2 8.88** 0.003  3.37 0.066 
3 8.56** 0.003  2.96 0.085 
4 8.23** 0.004  3.05 0.081 
5 8.65** 0.003  3.40 0.065 
Panel B: 2SLS regressions with the instrumental variable 
Variables First stage  Second stage 
 Model 14  Model 15 
Instrumental variable:     
R&D investment 0.49*** 
(0.06) 
  
Independent variable:     
Government subsidy (H1)   0.70** 
(0.27) 
Control variables:    
















































Industry dummies Included  Included 
City dummies Included  Included 
Year dummies Included  Included 
Adjust 𝐼𝐼2 0.68  0.26 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼-statistics   45.62*** 
𝐹𝐹-statistics   159.55 
Wald 𝜒𝜒2   4467.37*** 
Number of observations 1,232  1,232 















Three-Way Interaction Plots of Government Subsidy, Firm Leadership Change and Local Governors Change 
 
